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SHOULD NEITHER WIND NOR RAIN NOR
HURRICANE KEEP VICTIMS FROM RECOVERY?
EXAMINING THE TORT AND INSURANCE
SYSTEMS’ ABILITY TO COMPENSATE
HURRICANE VICTIMS
Kathleen A. Zink*
Large-scale natural disasters, such as hurricanes, wreak tremendous
havoc, causing billions of dollars in damages. Those who suffer serious
damage may turn to their insurance providers or the tort system for
compensation. But, both the tort and insurance systems present serious
limitations to a hurricane victim’s recovery. This Note analyzes the goals
and criticisms of these two systems to determine which compensates
hurricane victims best. In light of its analysis, this Note ultimately
concludes that neither system satisfactorily compensates victims. Yet, tort
could play some role in hurricane-related damage. Tort law could
effectively deter negligent behavior by imposing liability on those who
negligently fail to prepare and prevent hurricane-related damage.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 29, 2012, “Superstorm” Sandy made landfall on the coast of
New Jersey.1 Sandy’s powerful storm surge topped the sea wall in New
York City’s financial district, flooding lower Manhattan.2 Shortly after
breaching the sea wall, the record storm surge sent water pouring into the
basements and lobbies of downtown buildings, including 2 Gold Street and
201 Pearl Street.3 The saltwater crystallized in the basement of 2 Gold,
causing significant damage to the boiler and electrical switchboards.4
Further, the water caused the 20,000-gallon oil tank to rupture and release
oil into the floodwaters.5 The contaminated water released diesel fuel
fumes throughout the towers.6 The smell of diesel even reached apartments
on the highest floor of 2 Gold. 7 Due to the damages to operational systems,
including electric, hot water, water filtration, and sprinkler systems, “all of
which were below grade,” the building’s manager, TF Cornerstone,
informed the building’s residents that the earliest date for reoccupancy
would be March 1, 2013.8
On November 19, 2012, residents filed a putative class action in New
York State court alleging that TF Cornerstone negligently failed to secure
the premises, despite warnings issued by the National Hurricane Center and
the New York City government.9 The suit alleged gross negligence,
negligence, and breach of the warranty of habitability.10 The plaintiffs
claimed that TF Cornerstone failed to protect the property, particularly the
entrance to its parking garage with sandbags, or to take other effective
precautions. 11 The complaint also alleged that many apartments in the
building were burglarized by nonresidents because of the managing agent’s
negligence. 12 The plaintiffs seek, among other things, an award of
damages. 13
When the residents of 2 Gold and 201 Pearl suffered personal and
financial losses due to Hurricane Sandy, they turned to tort law for
compensation. Their other alternative, if insured, would have been to file a
claim with their insurance providers.

1. See Hurricane Sandy:
Timeline, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
http://www.fema.gov/hurricane-sandy-timeline (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
2. See Assessing the Damage from Hurricane Sandy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/10/30/nyregion/hurricane-sandysaftermath.html?_r=0.
3. See Summons & Class Action Complaint, ¶ 36, at 8, Cashwell v. 2 Gold, LLC (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 19, 2012) (No. 158155/2012), 2014 WL 3543541.
4. See id. ¶ 38, at 9.
5. Id. ¶ 39, at 9.
6. Id. ¶ 40, at 9.
7. See id.
8. See id. ¶ 53, at 11.
9. See id. ¶ 1, at 1–2.
10. See id. ¶ 54–74, at 11–14.
11. See id. ¶ 37, at 8.
12. See id. ¶ 43, at 9.
13. Id. at 15.
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In tort, a person who is harmed may file a civil lawsuit to recover
damages from the person who caused the harm.14 The law, however, will
only impose civil liability if the law recognizes a legal obligation, known as
a duty, owed to the injured person by the injurer.15 Tort law recognizes that
the person who should have prevented the injury should be held responsible
for the resulting injury and losses. 16 Thus, when an injured person is best
able to avoid his injuries, “[n]o one else [is] responsibl[e] for the harm that
has befallen him.”17 When the tort system imposes civil liability on a
defendant and provides a victim damages, it acts similarly to the insurance
system by shifting “the cost of providing financial resources for accident
victims” from the victim to another party.18
After a natural disaster like Hurricane Sandy, the insurance industry is
rarely left unaffected by the losses incurred by policyholders during the
storm. “[I]nsurance companies will pay an estimated 18.8 billion dollars in
claims to their policyholders” for property damage caused by Hurricane
Sandy, “making Sandy the third costliest storm in U.S. history, as defined
by insurance claims payouts.”19 Hurricane Katrina in 2005 cost insurance
companies $48.7 billion and Hurricane Andrew in 1992 cost $25.6 billion.20
The storm-related personal and financial losses like those suffered by the
residents of 2 Gold and 201 Pearl Street are not unusual and are expected to
increase in the United States.21 While there is no definitive scientific
evidence showing “whether storms like Sandy are growing more common,
evidence indicates climate change is already altering environmental
conditions in a way that suggests there may be changes in the frequency,
intensity, duration, and timing of future” storms.22 The federal and state

14. See infra Part I.A.
15. See infra Part I.A.1.
16. See MARSHA L. BAUM, WHEN NATURE STRIKES: WEATHER DISASTERS AND THE LAW
63 (2007).
17. See id. at 63–64.
18. See Beatrice A. Beltran, Posner and Tort Law As Insurance, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 153,
154 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. See Over 90 Percent of the New Jersey and New York Sandy Insurance Claims Have
Been Settled; Likely to Be Third Largest Storm Ever for U.S. Insurers, U.S. INS. INFO. INST.,
http://www.iii.org/press_releases/over-90-percent-of-the-new-jersey-and-new-york-sandyinsurance-claims-have-been-settled-likely-to-be-third-largest-hurricane-ever-for-usinsurers.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). These insurance payouts are for property
coverage only. Any flood damage covered by the National Flood Insurance Program is not
included. Id.
20. See id. The insured damage amounts for Hurricanes Katrina and Andrew have been
adjusted for inflation through 2012 by the Insurance Information Institute using the
Consumer Price Index. Id.
21. See HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING TASK FORCE, HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING
STRATEGY: STRONGER COMMUNITIES, A RESILIENT REGION 33 (2013) [hereinafter SANDY
REBUILDING STRATEGY].
22. See id.; see also Kerry A. Emanuel, Downscaling CMIP5 Climate Models Shows
Increased Tropical Cyclone Activity over the 21st Century, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.
AM. 12219 (2013). This study predicts a 40 percent global increase in hurricanes of
Category 3 and higher over the twenty-first century. Id. at 12221.
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governments have recognized these future risks and have responded
accordingly. 23
This Note considers whether courts should also play a role in hurricanerelated events by offering compensation through the tort system or rather
should leave compensation to insurers. Part I provides an overview of the
development of tort and the negligence doctrine, and outlines the problems
faced by hurricane victims when they turn to the tort system for
compensation. Part II examines the basics of insurance law, the insurance
issues raised by Hurricane Katrina, and both the state and federal responses
to hurricane-related insurance gaps. Part III details the justifications
advanced in favor of the tort and insurance systems, while also examining
these systems’ major criticisms. Finally, Part IV applies these goals and
criticisms to the circumstances of hurricane victims and suggests that
neither mechanism adequately compensates hurricane victims, although tort
may play a deterrence role in the hurricane-related context.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF TORT LAW
This part examines the development of tort law and the negligence
doctrine, and the role the doctrine plays within the law more broadly. It
next describes the elements of a traditional tort claim. It then explains the
role foreseeability plays in a court’s negligence analysis and how courts
sometimes use a balancing approach to determining liability. Finally, it
discusses hurricane-related tort issues.
Torts are broadly defined24 to encompass any “civil wrong, other than
breach of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of
an action for damages.”25 Tort law involves “many cases of first
impression” in which “new . . . torts are being recognized constantly.”26
The origins of tort law are found in early English common law. 27 In
English law, “remedies for wrongs depended upon the issuance of writs to
bring the defendant into court.”28 The number and forms of writs were
23. See SANDY REBUILDING STRATEGY, supra note 21; see also S. 3761, 2013 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013). The New York Senate passed a bill called the Natural
Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation Act, recognizing that New York’s climate and weather
patterns are changing, “due, in part, to global warming [and] that large areas of the state have
been severely impacted by repeated hurricanes, tropical storms and other weather related
natural disasters during the past few years.” Id.
24. See 1 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 2:1 (J.D. Lee & Barry A.
Lindahl eds., 2d rev. ed. 2002) [hereinafter 1 MODERN TORT LAW].
25. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 2
(5th ed. 1984). Although damages are the usual remedy in tort law, other remedies may also
be available, such as an injunction or specific restitution. Id. § 1, at 2 n.6.
26. Id. § 1, at 3; see, e.g., Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174, 177 (7th Cir. 1945) (holding
that a child has a cause of action against one for interfering with the support and
maintenance of its father); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946) (holding
that an unborn child, viable and capable of existing independently of the mother at the time
injuries are wrongfully inflicted, may, after birth, maintain an action for such injuries); Cole
v. Atlanta & W.P.R. Co., 31 S.E. 107, 107 (Ga. 1897) (holding a common carrier liable for
insulting a passenger).
27. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 6, at 29.
28. See id.
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limited, resulting in “a highly formal and artificial system of procedure,
which governed and controlled the law as to the substance of wrongs which
might be remedied.”29 Only two writs existed for tortious conduct: (1) the
action of trespass and (2) the action of trespass on the case.30 An action of
trespass was an action “for all forcible, direct and immediate injuries,
whether to person or to property.”31 Trespass on the case,32 on the other
hand, was developed as a complement to the action of trespass “to afford a
remedy for obviously wrongful conduct resulting in injuries which were not
forcible or not direct.”33 Today, tort law does not classify injuries as direct
or indirect, instead the law looks to remedy the intentional harms of the
tortfeasor or injuries resulting from his negligence. 34
A. Negligence Generally
Negligence35 is the primary standard for liability in the modern tort law
system. 36 The transition from the antiquated writs of trespass and action on
the case was accompanied by a growing recognition that, regardless of the
form of the action, there should be no liability for pure accident, and that
the defendant must be found to be at fault—possessing either a wrongful
intent or negligence. 37 Negligence diverged from intentional injuries

29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Trespass on the case is also known as action on the case. See id.
33. See id.
The classic illustration of the difference between trespass and case is that of a log
thrown into the highway. A person struck by the log as it fell could maintain
trespass against the thrower, since the injury was direct; but one who was hurt by
stumbling over it as it lay in the road could maintain, not trespass, but an action on
the case.
Id. The emphasis is on whether the injury was direct (trespass) or indirect (trespass on
the case). Id. § 6, at 29.
34. See id. § 8, at 34.
35. This Note explores the doctrine of negligence and does not explore intentional torts.
Intentional torts are separate from torts derived from negligence. An intentional tort “is one
in which the actor has the specific intent to inflict injury or engages in conduct that is
substantially certain to result in injury.” 74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 17 (2013). Hurricane-related
torts are generally not intentional, and therefore this Note does not explore intentional torts.
36. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern
American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 607 (1992). Negligence, however, is a relatively
new concept in tort law. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 149 (7th
ed. 2007). It was not until the nineteenth century, in response to a changing social and
political environment caused by the Industrial Revolution, that the negligence cause of
action was first recognized. Id. at 149, 153 (citing Cornelius J. Peck, Negligence and
Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 225, 229–30 (1971)). In contrast,
under early Anglo-Saxon and medieval common law, individuals were strictly liable for
causing injury to another individual. Id. at 149–50 (citing Peck, supra, at 225–26). For
example, “[t]he doer of a deed was responsible whether he acted innocently or inadvertently,
because he was the doer.” John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7
HARV. L. REV. 315, 317 (1894).
37. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 28, at 160–61.
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(which became a distinct field of liability) and became the “dominant cause
of action for accidental injury.”38
Legal historians generally cite Brown v. Kendall39 as the case which
introduced a fault-based, negligence paradigm to American tort law.40 In
Brown, two dogs “were fighting in the presence of their masters.”41 In an
effort to separate the two dogs, the defendant began beating the dogs with a
stick.42 At one point, the defendant raised his stick, hitting the plaintiff in
the eye and causing serious injury.43 The plaintiff sought to recover on the
writ of trespass,44 whereby a plaintiff traditionally could establish a prima
facie case simply by proving that his injuries were the direct result of the
defendant’s act—a relationship45 that clearly existed in this case. The
court, however, abolished the rule that a direct physical injury entailed strict
liability.46 The court held that the defendant should only be liable if he was
at fault.47 A defendant who attempted to beat a dog, but unintentionally
struck the plaintiff instead, would not be liable for battery despite applying
direct force.48 Instead, the defendant would be liable for battery only if he
intended to strike the plaintiff or if he was at fault in striking him. 49
According to the court, fault should be determined by whether or not the
defendant was acting with “ordinary care and prudence.”50
Negligence, therefore, is the failure to exercise reasonable care under all
the circumstances.51 In determining whether a person’s conduct falls below
the standard of reasonable care, courts consider the foreseeable likelihood
that the person’s conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any
harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce
the risk of harm. 52 Negligence may consist of an act or omission or failure
to act.53 Frequently, negligence involves the failure to take reasonable
precaution. 54
In the United States, each state develops its own tort law, “which
includes common law, settled disputes that have written judgments, and

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See id. § 28, at 161.
60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 28, at 163.
Brown, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) at 292.
Id.
Id. at 292–93.
Id. at 292.
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 6, at 29.
Brown, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) at 296.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 297.
Id.
Id. at 298.
See ELLEN M. BUBLICK, A CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 59 (3d ed. 2013).
See id. at 62.
See 1 MODERN TORT LAW, supra note 24, § 3:1.
See BUBLICK, supra note 51, at 63.
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legislation.”55 All state negligence law requires four elements to establish
liability: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages.56
1. Duty and Breach
There must be a legal duty “requiring a person to conform to a certain
standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable
risks.”57 If there is no legal duty, the defendant cannot be held liable for the
injuries he causes.58 Generally, every person “must conform to the legal
standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk.”59 A risk is
unreasonable if a reasonable person would have foreseen it.60
Duty is concerned with the relationship between individuals—“it
imposes a legal obligation on one party for the benefit of the other party.”61
Thus, courts look to whether a relationship exists between the parties to
determine whether a legal duty exists.62 Furthermore, the existence of a
duty is decided based on public policy considerations.63 Whether public
policy precludes liability is a matter of law decided by the court.64
Breach is the failure to conform to the required standard of conduct or
legal duty. 65 Although the term negligence is frequently used to mean a
breach of duty alone, courts use the term to mean the elements of duty and
breach together.66
2. Damage and Causation
The cause of action also requires loss or damage suffered by the
plaintiff.67 Thus, doing something that causes no harm does not constitute
an actionable tort.68 In the past, the types of harm for which compensation
were allowed were rather restricted.69 However, courts have steadily
expanded the categories of compensable harm.70 For example, some
modern courts compensate for intangible injuries, such as emotional harm
and loss of companionship.71
55. TERENCE J. CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE : POINTING FINGERS AND
SHUNNING RESTITUTION 23 (2008).
56. See id.
57. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 30, at 164.
58. See 1 MODERN TORT LAW, supra note 24, § 3:3.
59. Id.
60. See id. § 3:4.
61. Id. § 3:3.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 30, at 164.
66. See id.
67. See id. § 30, at 165.
68. See 74 AM. JUR 2D, supra note 35, § 9.
69. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 6, at 29.
70. See id. § 127, at 951–52.
71. See id.; see also Bradley v. Sebelius, 621 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating
that “under Florida law, in a recovery for wrongful death action, children of the decedent
may recover for lost parental companionship”); Christensen v. County of Boone, 483 F.3d
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Finally, the breach of duty must be the cause of the resulting injury.72
The plaintiff must show that the defendant’s tortious action is both the
actual cause, or “cause-in-fact,” and the proximate cause of his injuries.73
The defendant’s action is established as an actual cause by showing that the
harm would not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct.74
The second causal requirement for recovering damages is the
requirement that the defendant’s conduct be the proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s injuries. 75 Proximate cause is a legal construct that serves to
establish to what extent a tortfeasor will be held liable for his conduct.76 A
plaintiff must fulfill three basic requirements in establishing proximate
cause: “(1) that without the misconduct, the injury would not have
occurred, commonly known as the ‘but for’ rule; (2) that the injury was a
natural and probable result of the misconduct; and (3) that there was no
efficient intervening cause.”77 Even if a defendant is the “but for” cause of
a plaintiff’s injuries, a court, through the proximate cause analysis, may
determine that other considerations outweigh holding a defendant liable,
such as policy reasons.78
3. Foreseeability
Foreseeability of injury is generally recognized as an element of the duty
analysis.79 To establish an actor’s negligence, the risk of harm to others
“must be foreseeable to the actor at the time of his conduct.”80 A plaintiff
can show negligence by proving that the defendant failed to take a
precaution that would have reduced the likelihood of harm.81 Usually, this
precaution “will consist of some way in which the actor could have
modified the activity engaged in.”82
B. The Balancing Approach to Negligence
A finding of negligence may depend on a court’s cost-benefit analysis.83
Following Brown, courts became more willing to balance the social benefit
of an activity with the risk of harm to the public in determining whether the
defendant presented an unreasonable risk of harm to another.84
454, 465 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that Illinois law “recognizes the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress”).
72. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 30, at 165.
73. See 74 AM. JUR 2D, supra note 35, § 27.
74. Id. § 26.
75. Id. § 27.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See 1 MODERN TORT LAW, supra note 24, § 3:4.
80. See BUBLICK, supra note 51, at 62.
81. See id. at 63.
82. Id. at 64.
83. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 34 (1972).
84. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The
American Civil Justice System As a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 26
(2002).
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In United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,85 Judge Learned Hand articulated
a balancing test as the standard for determining questions of liability.86
Carroll Towing was an admiralty case in which a barge in a busy harbor
broke loose of its moorings, collided with a tanker, and sank.87 The harm
could have been avoided if a caretaker or bargee had been on board at all
times, but the bargee had left the barge the night before.88 The question
was whether the absence of a bargee makes the owner of a barge liable for
damages to other vessels when the barge breaks from its moorings.89
While discussing the barge owner’s negligence, Judge Hand held that
“the owner’s duty . . . is a function of three variables: (1) The probability
that [the barge] will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if
she does; [and] (3) the burden of adequate precautions.”90 Specifically, the
probability is the “overall level of the foreseeable risk created by the actor’s
conduct and the ‘benefit’ is the advantages that the actor or others gain if
the actor refrains from taking precautions.”91
Judge Hand further held that the variables could be stated in algebraic
terms: “if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e.,
whether B < PL.”92 The burden can take many forms, but is usually a
financial burden borne by the actor.93 Thus, the Hand formula is
susceptible to economic reasoning. 94 Under the Hand balancing test, a
court should hold a defendant liable when he failed to exercise care in a
setting in which the cost of additional care “is less than the expected injury
costs that be avoided” (B < PL).95
C. Tort Law in the Natural Disaster Context:
Hurricanes, Negligence, and Acts of God
Historically, mankind attributed changes in the weather to divine
forces.96 The concept that weather and its consequences are caused by
divine forces has slowly penetrated the law.97 Large-scale natural disasters
have become “viewed as and often called ‘Acts of God’ . . . ‘vis major’, or
‘force of nature.’”98 In tort law, defendants have often asserted an act of
85. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
86. Id. at 173; see also Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1501, 1502 n.7 (2006).
87. See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 171.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 172.
90. Id. at 173.
91. See BUBLICK, supra note 51, at 60.
92. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
93. See id.
94. See Hylton, supra note 86, at 1503.
95. See id.
96. See Kenneth T. Kristl, Diminishing the Divine: Climate Change and the Act of God
Defense, 15 WIDENER L. REV. 325, 325 (2010).
97. See id.
98. Id.; see, e.g., Woodbine Auto, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 8 F. Supp. 2d 475, 481
(E.D. Pa. 1998) (citations omitted) (“It is well-established that the affirmative defense of vis
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God defense to avoid liability.99 What constitutes an act of God varies in
different jurisdictions.100 But many courts define acts of God as natural
forces, which “must be something more” than ordinary natural events.101
Courts describe acts of God as natural forces that are “extraordinary,”
“unexpected,” “sudden,” “unusual,” and “unprecedented.”102 Furthermore,
courts consider the intensity of the event, characteristics of the area, and
climatic history in order to determine whether a particular event should be
classified as an act of God. 103
1. Foreseeability of Acts of God
Foreseeability plays a role in courts’ determination of whether a natural
event should be defined as an act of God. 104 Courts require that the event
“be one that no amount of reasonable foresight . . . or care could have
prevented.”105 In a negligence action, acts of God relate to the issue of

major or force of nature (formerly ‘Act of God’) is the concept of a natural force of such
inevitability and irresistibleness that man cannot cope with it, either to predict, forestall it or
control it when it arrives.”).
99. See Kristl, supra note 96, at 328.
100. See id. at 329.
101. Id. at 329–30.
102. See, e.g., Barnard-Curtiss Co. v. United States, 257 F.2d 565, 568 (10th Cir. 1958)
(holding that a flood could only be an act of God if the rains were “an unprecedented and
extraordinary occurrence of unusual proportions”); Dollar Thrifty Auto Grp., Inc. v. BohnDC, LLC, 23 So. 3d 301, 304 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that “[a] hurricane that causes
unexpected and unforeseeable devastation with unprecedented wind velocity, tidal rise, and
upriver tidal surge is a classic case of an ‘Act of God’ or force majeure”); Brown v.
Williams, 850 So. 2d 1116, 1123 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (defining act of God as “an unusual,
sudden and unexpected manifestation of the forces of nature which man cannot resist”).
103. See, e.g., Keystone Electric Mfg., Co. v. City of Des Moines, 586 N.W.2d 340, 351
(Iowa 1998) (holding that to determine whether a flood should be characterized as an act of
God, “courts consider whether the flood’s ‘occurrence and magnitude should or might have
been anticipated, in view of the flood history of the locality and the existing conditions
affecting the likelihood of floods, by a person of reasonable prudence’” (quoting 72 AM. JUR.
2D Waters § 224, at 669 (1975))); McCutcheon v. Tri-County Grp. XV, Inc., 920 S.W.2d
627, 632 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the act of God defense is only available
“where it is ‘an event in nature so extraordinary that the history of climatic variations in the
locality affords no reasonable warning of their coming’ and is not humanized through the
participation of man” (quoting Corrington v. Kalicak, 319 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Mo. Ct. App.
1959)); Sky Aviation Corp. v. Colt, 475 P.2d 301, 304 (Wyo. 1970) (holding that ordinary
acts of nature “which are usual at the time and place” which reasonably could not have been
anticipated will not relieve a negligent person of liability).
104. See Kristl, supra note 96, at 331.
105. See id.; see also Brown v. Sandals Resorts Int’l, 284 F.3d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 2002)
(holding that under South Dakota law, “an act of God is defined as ‘any accident, due
directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no amount
of foresight, pains, or care, reasonably to have been expected, could have been prevented’”
(quoting Nw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Henry Carlson Co., 165 N.W.2d 346, 349 (S.D. 1969)));
Rector v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 120 So. 2d 511, 514–15 (La. Ct. App. 1960)
(stating that an act of God is an “extraordinary manifestation of the forces of nature which
could not have been foreseen and the effect thereof avoided by the exercise of reasonable
prudence, diligence and care” (quoting S. Air Transp. v. Gulf Airways, 40 So. 2d 786, 791
(La. 1949)); L.G. Balfour Co. v. Ablondi & Boynton Corp., 338 N.E.2d 841, 844 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1975) (defining act of God as a force not attributable to the conduct of man and not
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negligence in terms of the foreseeability of the natural event and the
foreseeability of harm occasioned by the actor’s conduct.106 Relevant to
foreseeability is preventative or precautionary measures available to an
actor.107
Several forms of precautions can be relevant in protecting against
extraordinary natural events or acts of God. 108 For example, an “actor can
be negligent in building facilities that are unreasonably inadequate in
protecting against foreseeable natural events.”109 Thus, an actor may be
negligent in designing or constructing a building that collapses during a
hurricane.110 In such a case, the foreseeable likelihood of harm relates to
which serious natural events can be contemplated during the expected life
of the building.111 An actor can also be negligent for failing to adopt
appropriate precautions when a serious adverse natural event is
imminent.112 In conducting a negligence analysis in such a case, however,
the immediacy of the natural event reduces the significance of foreseeability
as a negligence factor, although foreseeability is still a concern in terms of
the severity of the storm. 113
2. Sole Proximate Cause
An act of God defense may or may not relieve an actor of liability. A
determination of liability usually depends on whether or not the act of God
is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damage. 114 If the act of God is the
sole or exclusive cause, then an actor will avoid liability.115 However, “in
cases of joint causation, when two causes, one of human origin and the
other of natural origin, combine to cause [an] injury,” it is difficult to
allocate liability between the negligent act of the defendant and the natural
cause.116 Some courts will not allow the defendant to escape liability if
there is some element of human activity or intervention that contributes in
some way to the injury.117 However, other courts may allow a defendant to
limit his liability to that portion of the injury his own conduct caused.118
reasonably “preventable by human foresight, strength or care” (quoting Hecht v. Bos. Wharf
Co., 107 N.E. 990, 991 (Mass. 1915)).
106. See BUBLICK, supra note 51, at 65–66.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 65.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 65–66.
114. See Denis Binder, Act of God? Or Act of Man?: A Reappraisal of the Act of God
Defense in Tort Law, 15 REV. LITIG. 1, 24–28 (1996); Kristl, supra note 96, at 332–33.
115. Kristl, supra note 96, at 333.
116. See Binder, supra note 114, at 24.
117. See, e.g., Inland Power & Light Co. v. Grieger, 91 F.2d 811, 816–17 (9th Cir. 1937)
(stating that when an act of God is concurrent with defendant’s negligence, defendant is
liable as if he had caused the harm); Fairbrother v. Wiley’s Inc., 331 P.2d 330, 336–37 (Kan.
1958) (declaring that defendant is not excused from liability when the “‘act of God’ would
not have wrought the injury but for the human negligence which contributed thereto”);
Supervisor & Comm’rs v. Jennings, 107 S.E. 312, 315 (N.C. 1921) (describing the well-
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The causation analysis primarily focuses on the reasonableness of the
defendant’s conduct in light of the foreseeable risks.119 If the defendant
could have reasonably expected that the resulting injuries might have been
avoided or prevented by reasonable care or foresight, liability may ensue.120
Thus, an act of God defense will fail if “one builds in geologically fragile
areas, or with improper building methods, or follows up with inadequate
inspection and maintenance.”121
3. Negligence and Invoking the Act of God Defense
To successfully invoke the act of God defense, the party asserting the
defense must prove not only the occurrence of the act of God but must also
establish lack of fault in order to avoid liability.122 For example, in Skandia
Insurance Co. v. Star Shipping,123 plaintiffs sought recovery for damage to
their cargo sustained due to flooding associated with Hurricane Georges
while sitting in a container yard in Alabama.124 The parties did not dispute
that the hurricane was an act of God. 125 The plaintiffs, however, argued
that, even though the hurricane was an act of God, the defendants were
liable because they failed to take reasonable precautions in securing the
containers or moving them out of harm’s way. 126 In response, the
defendants invoked the act of God defense, arguing that the damage “could
not have been prevented by reasonable care and foresight.”127 Specifically,
they argued it was impossible to move the containers in time to avoid the
damage. 128
First, the court accepted that an act of God defense was applicable to the
case, noting that the law considers hurricanes to be acts of God.129 Next,
the court also accepted that the defense could be asserted in the present
circumstances because statutes traditionally exempt the responsibilities of
settled rule that the defendant is responsible even though his negligence is concurrent with
an act of God).
118. See, e.g., McAdams v. Chi., R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 205 N.W. 310, 311 (Iowa 1925)
(holding that a negligent defendant should not be liable for damages that would have resulted
from a flood regardless of the defendant’s actions); Rix v. Town of Alamogordo, 77 P.2d
765, 770 (N.M. 1938) (supporting the trial court’s attempt to apportion damages between
those injuries resulting from unusual rainfall and those resulting from a combination of
extraordinary rainfall and defendant’s negligent acts); Radburn v. Fir Tree Lumber Co., 145
P. 632, 633 (Wash. 1915) (holding that the defendant should be liable only for damages to
crops resulting from the defendant’s negligent act but should not be liable for damages
resulting from rainfall).
119. See Binder, supra note 114, at 29.
120. Id. at 25.
121. Id. at 25–26.
122. See Skandia Ins. Co. v. Star Shipping AS, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1241–42 (S.D. Ala.
2001).
123. 173 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (S.D. Ala. 2001).
124. Id. at 1233.
125. Id. at 1233 n.2.
126. See id. at 1233.
127. Id. at 1238.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1239–40.
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shippers and carriers, like the defendants, from liability for losses caused by
an act of God. 130 Yet, the court concluded that the defense would apply
only in the absence of contributing human negligence.131 Thus, the
defendant not only had to prove that the natural event constituted an act of
God but also had to show that “damage from the natural event could not
have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care.”132
If a defendant had adequate warning and the means to take proper
precautions but failed to do so, then the defendant cannot invoke the act of
God defense and thus is responsible for any loss.133 However, if there were
insufficient warnings or insufficient means to prevent the damage, then the
defendant is not liable for the loss. 134 In other words, the accident or
damage must be unforeseeable and unavoidable to support the defense. 135
The Skandia Insurance court found that Hurricane Georges, although an
act of God, was not of such catastrophic proportions as to totally absolve
the defendants of the responsibility to take reasonable precautions and to
preclude any negligence assessment. 136 Thus, the court looked to whether
the defendant had established its lack of fault.137 Given that weather
reports leading up to the storm were inconsistent and constantly changing,
the court held that the defendants lacked adequate notice of the approaching
storm and therefore could not have prevented the loss caused by the
hurricane.138 The court also determined that none of the defendants were
aware that the container yards where the containers were stored had been
flooded in previous storms.139 The defendants successfully established that
reasonable care would not have prevented the water damage to the cargo.140
Therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recovery because the cargo
damage was caused by an act of God and not due to any negligence on the
part of the defendants.141
D. What Remains for Tort? Further Limitations to Tort Recovery
in a Natural Disaster Context
All levels of government play a role in providing assistance during and
after natural disasters.142 The federal government exercises its role through

130. Id. at 1240.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1241 (quoting Mamiye Bros. v. Barber S.S. Lines, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 99, 107
(S.D.N.Y. 1965)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1243.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1243–53.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1253.
141. Id. at 1252.
142. David G. Tucker & Alfred O. Bragg III, Florida’s Law of Storms: Emergency
Management, Local Government, and the Police Power, 30 STETSON L. REV. 837, 838
(2001).
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the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).143 At the state and
local levels, governments mobilize resources and coordinate response
efforts.144
Tort law, however, is private law.145 Typically, “[t]he parties are not the
public, nor strangers to the controversy, but rather are the actors and victims
themselves.”146 Thus, natural disasters and large-scale emergencies limit
the role of tort law because the primary actors are usually public entities or
government employees who enjoy some degree of immunity.147
1. Sovereign Immunity Generally
The concept of sovereign immunity is rooted in the medieval English
idea that kings could not be sued because they were governed by divine
right and could do no wrong. 148 As the state replaced the monarch, it also
took on the sovereign’s immunity.149 The doctrine of sovereign immunity
was also adopted in the United States and, for a significant period of time,
courts held that governmental entities were immune from tort liability.150
However, as recently as the middle of the twentieth century, the federal and
state governments surrendered their absolute immunity from suit.151
Nevertheless, some kind of immunity for government entities still
remains. 152
2. Federal and State Immunity
In 1946, the federal government waived its immunity to tort actions
under certain circumstances by enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act153
(FTCA). Under the FTCA, the government is liable for torts in much the
same way a private actor would be liable.154 The FTCA, however, carves
out an exception for claims based upon the performance or failure to
perform a “discretionary function or duty.”155
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. See George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-Tort World?, 112 PENN
ST. L. REV. 175, 177 (2007).
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 334 (2d ed. 2011).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850) (stating that the
doctrine is “universally assented to” and “no maxim is thought to be better established”);
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Briggs v. Light-Boat Upper Cedar Point,
93 Mass. (11 Allen) 157, 162 (1865) (recognizing that “[i]t is an elementary and familiar
principle of English and American constitutional law, that no direct suit can be brought
against the sovereign in his own courts without his consent”).
151. See 2 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 148, § 334.
152. Id.
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012); see also 2 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 148, § 335.
154. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (stating that “[t]he United States shall be liable . . . [in] tort
claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances”).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
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To determine whether this exception applies, the U.S. Supreme Court
articulated a two-prong test in Berkovitz v. United States156 and affirmed the
test in United States v. Gaubert.157 First, a court must consider if the
governmental action in question involved an element of judgment or choice
on the part of a government actor.158 The exception cannot apply if a
federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically mandates a course of action
for the actor to follow.159 Thus, if the government fails to act in accordance
with a specific, mandatory directive, the government is vulnerable to
suit.160 Second, if the challenged conduct does involve an element of
judgment, that judgment must be based on policy considerations—the types
of judgments the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.161
This second prong is met if the actions were susceptible to policy analysis,
whether or not the government employee actually made a policy
determination.162 Furthermore, there is a strong presumption that if the
regulation affords the employee discretion, the employee’s discretionary
actions necessarily involve policy considerations.163 In sum, for a tort
claim against the federal government to be successful a plaintiff must first
show that the conduct in question does not fall within the discretionary
function exception. 164
Other statutes, especially where the federal government chooses to
involve itself in the natural disaster or emergency context, specifically
recognize an exception to tort liability or retain governmental immunity
altogether.165 For example, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Act,166 which constitutes the statutory authority for most federal
disaster responses (especially as they pertain to the Federal Emergency
Management Agency), includes a discretionary function or duty exemption
from liability.167 The Flood Control Act of 1928 (FCA) also contains an
immunity provision, which states: “No liability of any kind shall attach to
or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood
waters at any place.”168 Enacted in 1928 in response to the devastating
flood of the Mississippi River Valley in 1927, the Flood Control Act was
156. 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
157. 499 U.S. 315 (1991).
158. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 544.
161. Id. at 536. The Court noted that the discretionary function exception was designed
to “prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded
in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.” Id. at 536–
37 (citations omitted).
162. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325.
163. See id. at 324.
164. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 544.
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2012).
166. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207. The Stafford Act guarantees that disaster victims will
receive help through FEMA, which may include financial assistance. See id. § 5174.
167. See id. § 5148. This section provides that “[t]he Federal Government shall not be
liable for any claim based upon the exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty.” See id.
168. See 33 U.S.C. § 702c.

2014]

HURRICANE VICTIM COMPENSATION

1637

the federal government’s first major foray into natural disaster
management. 169 Although enacted before the FTCA, courts interpreted the
FCA to immunize the federal government from suit for any damages
resulting from negligence in flood-related activities.170 The Supreme
Court, however, narrowed the FCA immunity in Central Green Co. v.
United States.171 The Court articulated a new test requiring consideration
of the “character of the waters that cause the relevant damage rather than
the relation between that damage and a flood control project.”172 The Court
required a more case-by-case inquiry into the “character of the waters,”
recognizing that some floodwaters are immune and others are not.173 Thus,
the Court opened the government up to liability for damages caused by
certain floodwaters.174
Sovereign immunity exists at the state and local levels as well. The
Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution bars actions against a state in
federal court absent consent, waiver, or abrogation of the state’s sovereign
immunity. 175 The doctrine of sovereign immunity is statutorily based in
most states,176 and constitutionally based in others.177 Like the federal
government, state laws relating to disaster management, whether natural or
manmade, also provide for governmental immunity. 178
3. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation:
Governmental Immunity as a Bar to Recovery
for Hurricane-Related Damage
In 1956, Congress authorized construction of the Mississippi River Gulf
Outlet (MRGO), which was completed in 1968 and created a shorter
169. See Sarah Juvan, Note, The Federal Flood Control Act:
Congressional
Development of a Modern-Day Ark, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 303, 306 (1996). The Act “provided
for a comprehensive program of flood control projects, including the building of dikes,
dams, and levees.” Id.
170. See United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 608, 612 (1986) (holding that the
immunity provision provided absolute immunity to the federal government for any damage
related to flood control activities); Nat’l Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 270 (8th
Cir. 1954) (holding that when Congress enacted the FCA, it “safeguarded the United States
against liability of any kind for damage from or by floods or flood waters in the broadest and
most emphatic language”).
171. 531 U.S. 425 (2001).
172. See Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. at 437.
173. See id. at 436, 437.
174. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 471 F. Supp. 2d 684, 694 (E.D. La.
2007).
175. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
176. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104 (2005);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8103 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1401 (2006); MO. REV.
STAT. § 537.600 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-A:1 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:1-2
(West 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4 (West 2006); 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2310 (West
2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60 (2005); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021
(West 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-104 (2006).
177. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13; KY. CONST. § 231; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 18; W.
VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35.
178. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-314 (2006); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8655 (West
2006); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7704 (West 2006).
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shipping route between the Gulf of Mexico and New Orleans.179 At the
same time, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also implemented the Lake
Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Plan to protect areas of
New Orleans from flooding. 180 The channel’s original designers considered
and rejected a plan to armor its banks with foreshore protection, leaving
them vulnerable to erosion.181
The Corps’s delay in armoring the MRGO allowed wave wash from large
vessels to erode the channel considerably and added more fetch,182 allowing
for more forceful wave attack on the levees.183 When Hurricane Katrina
struck New Orleans in August 2005, the MRGO’s expansion allowed
Hurricane Katrina to generate a peak storm surge that breached the levee
and flooded the city.184 Many property owners sought recovery for their
losses by filing lawsuits in federal court, naming the federal government as
a defendant.185 One group of seven plaintiffs, the Robinson plaintiffs, went
to trial.186 After nineteen days of trial, the district court found that neither
the immunity provision of the FCA nor the discretionary-function exception
to the FTCA protected the government from suit.187 The court found three
of the seven plaintiffs had successfully proven the government’s liability.188
The government appealed the district court ruling to the Fifth Circuit.189
In March 2012, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling190 because
the MRGO was not a flood-control project.191 The court noted that had the
Corps installed foreshore protection on the MRGO, it would have given the
canal the immune character of a flood-control activity.192 The government
failed to install flood-control protections, however, and therefore could not
claim FCA immunity.193 The Fifth Circuit next turned to the FTCA and the
discretionary function exception, upholding the district court’s ruling that
the exception did not bar the suit.194 After determining that the decision
about whether to armor the MRGO’s banks involved an element of
judgment, thus satisfying the first prong of the Berkovitz test, the court
considered whether the Corps’s inaction met the second prong by involving
179. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc),
rev’g 673 F.3d 381.
180. Id. at 442.
181. Id.
182. “Fetch is defined as the width of open water that wind can act upon. The height of
waves . . . is a function of the depth of the water as well as the width of the expanse (i.e., the
fetch) over which wind impacts the water.” Id. at 443 n.2.
183. Id. at 443.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 673 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2012), rev’d by 696
F.3d 436.
191. See id. at 389.
192. Id. at 390.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 391.
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policy considerations.195 The court found that the discretionary function of
the FTCA was inapplicable because the key judgment made by the Corps
involved only the use of objective scientific principles and not any publicpolicy considerations.196
Following the adverse ruling, an en banc panel reversed the judgments
for the plaintiffs and granted judgment for the government.197 The Fifth
Circuit left the holding on the FCA immunity undisturbed from the initial
The court, however, reassessed its application of the
ruling. 198
discretionary function exception, finding that there was “ample record
evidence indicating the public-policy character of the Corps’s various
decisions.”199 The Fifth Circuit explored the availability of alternatives to
armoring the banks and found that “[t]he Corps’s actual reasons for the
delay are varied and sometimes unknown, but there can be little dispute that
the decisions here were susceptible to policy considerations.”200 Thus,
finding that the discretionary function exception did in fact apply to the
Corps’s actions, the court held that the exception “completely insulates the
government from liability.”201
II. AN OVERVIEW OF INSURANCE
This part first defines insurance and property insurance coverage against
natural forces. It next describes the insurance issues raised by Hurricane
Katrina. Finally, it details government involvement in natural disaster
insurance, specifically Florida’s Hurricane Catastrophe Fund and the
federal government’s National Flood Insurance Program.
A. Insurance Basics
“[I]nsurance is a contract by which one party (the insurer), for a
consideration that usually is paid in money . . . promises to make a certain
payment, usually of money, upon the destruction or injury of ‘something’ in
which the other party (the insured) has an interest.”202 The thing that must
be destroyed or injured to trigger the insurer’s obligation varies according
to the nature of the contract.203 For example, in the case of fire insurance or
windstorm insurance, the thing insured is property.204 Risk is the very
nature of insurance, and individuals take an intellectual gamble when
195. Id. at 391–96.
196. Id. at 391. “The Corps misjudged the hydrological risk posed by the erosion of
MRGO’s banks.” Id.
197. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc),
rev’g 673 F.3d 381. Presented with a petition for rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit treated
the petition as a petition for rehearing and withdrew its initial March 2012 ruling. See id.
198. Id. at 444–48.
199. Id. at 451.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 454.
202. See 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:6 (Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla eds., 3d rev.
ed. 2011).
203. Id.
204. Id.
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purchasing insurance as they weigh the expense of purchasing insurance
against the amount of coverage they purchase.205
1. First-Party Insurance Versus Third-Party Insurance
Insurance policies can be classified in two ways, focusing on who bears
the loss: first-party insurance and third-party insurance.206 First-party
insurance covers losses suffered by the policyholder herself.207 Under a
first-party insurance scheme, an insurance company “pays [the insured] as
soon as the damage occurs, provided that it can be proven that the particular
damage is an insured risk covered by the insurance policy,” regardless of
whether there is liability. 208 Accordingly, first-party insurance protection is
removed from tort law and provides an insurance scheme whereby insureds
ex ante seek coverage.209 First-party insurance can be divided further into
two groups: (1) personal injury insurance and (2) property insurance.210
In contrast, third-party insurance provides coverage for losses caused by
the policyholder.211 These losses are incurred by someone other than the
policyholder and expose the policyholder to legal liability for causing the
loss.212 Thus, third-party insurance “treat[s] the loss being insured against
as that of the outside party.”213 Malpractice liability insurance is a common
example of third-party insurance. 214
2. Property Insurance
One of the most common forms of insurance is property insurance, which
“includes a broad spectrum of policies and coverages applicable to just
about any type of property that exists.”215 For insurance purposes, property
can generally be divided into many categories, including real property and
personal property.216 The type of property influences the coverage terms,
such as specific inclusions and specific exclusions “because [the type]
influence[s] the degree to which the property tends to be exposed to various
categories of risk.”217 The major risk categories include: (1) deliberate
theft; (2)
misplacement,
misdelivery,
or unexplained loss;
205. See 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 2 (2013). For additional detail about insurance and
risk, see infra Part III.C–D.
206. See Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. INS.
L.J. 29, 35–36 (2012). This Note will focus on first-party insurance, and property insurance
in particular. In the hurricane-related context, victims will primarily turn to their property
insurance policy, if available, for compensation. See infra Part II.B.
207. See Avraham, supra note 206, at 35.
208. See Michael Faure & Véronique Bruggeman, Catastrophic Risks and First-Party
Insurance, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2008).
209. Id. at 12.
210. Id. at 13.
211. See Avraham, supra note 206, at 35–36.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 36 n.6.
214. See id. at 36.
215. See 10A COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 148:1.
216. See id. § 148:3.
217. Id.
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(3) contamination, pollution, and the like; and (4) breakage/physical
damage/destruction.218 Breakage/physical damage/destruction is a broad
risk category that includes several subcategories, including water and
wind.219
The standard property policy specifies the perils and resulting losses it
covers.220 Most modern insurance policies, however, cover multiple perils
or provide blanket coverage for “all perils.”221 Specifically, natural force
perils may be explicitly included or excluded in a policy.222 Insureds, for
example, “may purchase insurance to cover loss resulting from violent
storms or high winds [that] may be given any of several labels, including
cyclone, hurricane, storm, tornado, and windstorm or weather
insurance.”223
In order to recover from the insurer, the windstorm must be the
proximate cause of the damage the insured sustained.224 Proximate cause in
insurance law, however, is different from proximate cause in tort cases.225
Some courts have defined proximate cause as the efficient cause or the
cause that sets other causes in motion.226 Under this definition, an insurer
is liable for an insured’s claim when the damages sustained were the result
of a risk or peril covered in the insurance policy.227 Courts have further
expanded efficient proximate cause to permit recovery in circumstances in
which two or more causes, one of which is a covered peril and one of which
is an excluded peril, act concurrently to cause a single loss and the covered
peril is determined to be the efficient proximate cause.228 However,
insurers generally contract out of the efficient proximate cause doctrine.229

218. Id.
219. Id. The most relevant subcategories for this Note’s consideration are water and
wind. Other subcategories include (1) fire, explosion, or both, (2) freezing and overheating,
(3) collision with other objects, (4) mishandling, (5) vandalism and other deliberate acts, and
(6) misuse and overuse. Id.
220. See id. § 148:48. In a policy against:
damage by tornado, hurricane, or windstorm, the words “tornado” and “hurricane”
are synonymous. . . . The word “windstorm” partially takes its meaning from
“tornado” and “hurricane” and indicates wind of unusual violence. A “windstorm”
need not have either the cyclonic or the whirling features, which usually
accompany tornadoes or cyclones, but it must assume the aspect of a storm—that
is, an outburst of tumultuous force.
See 43 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 205, § 472.
221. See 10A COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 148:50; 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE,
supra note 202, § 153:2.
222. See 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 153:2.
223. Id. § 153:4.
224. Id. § 153:12.
225. See 43 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 205, § 470.
226. See 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 101:45; see, e.g., Kish v. Ins. Co. of
N. Am., 883 P.2d 308, 311 (Wash. 1994) (holding that the efficient proximate cause rule
operates to permit coverage when an insured peril sets other excluded perils in motion).
227. See 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 101:45.
228. Id.
229. Id.; see also TNT Speed & Sport Ctr., Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 731, 733
(8th Cir. 1997) (holding that language in an insurance policy reflects the insurer’s intent to
contract out of application of the efficient proximate cause doctrine).
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Thus, issues of recovery may arise when there is a question of whether
the windstorm was in fact the proximate cause of the damage.230
Specifically, issues of recovery arise when the property damage could have
been caused by either windstorm or improper construction of the
property. 231 Recovery is only possible “if the windstorm was the cause of
the damage, and not the improper construction.”232
Additionally, even if water is a contributing cause to property damage, an
insured may only recover under a policy insuring against a windstorm if the
wind is found to be the proximate cause of the damage. 233 Furthermore,
recovery is only possible “if the policy does not contain an exclusion for
water-related perils.”234 Typically, water is an excluded peril, preventing
recovery, unless wind first damages the property, and water enters the
property through openings made by the wind.235
To recover under a windstorm policy, the insured must show that the
property damage falls within specified perils of the policy.236 If the insured
can show that damage is covered, then the burden shifts to the insurer to
establish that the damage falls within a specified exclusion.237
B. Insurance Issues Raised by Hurricane Katrina
On August 31, 2005, two days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall in
the Gulf States, at least 80 percent of New Orleans was under floodwater,
largely as a result of levee failures. 238 The hurricane’s strong forces led to
breaks in the levee, flooding New Orleans with twenty feet of water.239 In
Mississippi, parts of Biloxi and Gulfport were also flooded as a result of the
hurricane’s storm surge.240 Despite nearly half of the property damage
being caused by waters rather than wind, only a few property owners had
flood insurance coverage under the National Flood Insurance Program.241
Instead, affected property owners had to turn to their private insurance for
compensation.242 It became clear, however, that many of the property
losses resulting from Hurricane Katrina were not covered by insurance.243

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, §§ 153:17, :23.
Id. § 153:23.
Id.
See id. § 153:16.
Id.; see also infra Part II.B.
See 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 153:17.
Id. § 153:25.
Id.
See NAT’ L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT’L CLIMATIC DATA CTR.,
HURRICANE KATRINA 5 (2005), available at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/extremeevents
/specialreports/Hurricane-Katrina.pdf.
239. See id.
240. Id.
241. See Howard A. VanDine III & Erik T. Norton, Anti-Concurrent Causation Clauses
and Hurricane Relief: Was It Wind or Water?, S.C. LAW., Jan. 2008, at 19. See infra Part
II.C.2.a for a description of the National Flood Insurance Program.
242. VanDine III & Norton, supra note 242.
243. See Craig A. Cohen & Mark H. Rosenberg, After the Storm: Courts Grapple with
the Insurance Coverage Issues Resulting from Hurricane Katrina, 43 TORT TRIAL & INS.
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Consequently, many policyholders sued their insurance companies,
“challeng[ing] insurer decisions limiting or denying coverage for hurricanerelated claims.”244
In Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,245 plaintiffs sought
coverage from their insurance company for damage caused by Hurricane
Katrina.246 The Leonards’ home was twelve feet above sea level on the
southernmost edge of Pascagoula, Mississippi, less than two hundred yards
from the Mississippi Sound. 247 During Hurricane Katrina, a storm surge
flooded the first level of the Leonards’ two-story home.248 The Leonards’
homeowner’s policy from Nationwide was an “all-risk” policy, which
covered “all damage to dwellings and personal property not otherwise
excluded.”249 Nationwide’s policy, however, only covered damage caused
by certain “perils” and excluded damages caused by others.250 For
example, the Leonards’ policy insured against wind damage to a dwelling
and to personal property but excluded damage caused by water.251 The
water-damages exclusion language of the Leonards’ policy also addressed
situations in which an excluded peril and a covered peril combine to
damage a dwelling or personal property.252 This language denied coverage
whenever an excluded peril and a covered peril acted concurrently to
combine damage. 253
Following the storm, inspection of the Leonards’ home revealed modest
wind damage: the roof suffered broken shingles and loss of ceramic
granules, doors in the house and garage had been blown open, and a “golfball sized” hole was found in a ground-floor window.254 The water
damage, however, was extensive. 255 While the second floor of the house
remained untouched, a seventeen-foot storm surge flooded the first floor
with five feet of water.256 The waters severely damaged the walls, floors,
fixtures, and personal property.257 After the insurance adjuster evaluated
the damage, the Leonards received a check for $1661.17—“the amount
determined attributable solely to wind.”258 Nationwide denied coverage for

PRAC. L.J. 139, 140 (2008) (providing a summary of hurricane-related insurance litigation);
see also supra notes 232–34 and accompanying text.
244. See Cohen, supra note 243, at 140.
245. 499 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2007).
246. See Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 423 (5th Cir. 2007).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 424.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 425.
253. Id. This language is “commonly referred to as an ‘anticoncurrent-causation clause,’
or ‘ACC clause.’” Id.
254. Id. at 426.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. “At trial, the Leonards offered expert testimony that the total damages actually
exceeded $130,000, but this figure did not apportion damages caused by different perils.
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most of the Leonards’ claim because the damages caused by water and the
storm surge’s concurrent wind-water action were barred by the water
damages exclusion and the anticoncurrent-causation clause (ACC) of the
Leonards’ policy, respectively. 259
Following a bench trial, the Southern District of Mississippi held that the
ACC clause was ambiguous, concluding: “Thus, [the ACC] language does
not exclude coverage for different damage, the damage caused by wind, a
covered peril, even if the wind damage occurred concurrently or in
sequence with the excluded water damage. The wind damage is covered;
the water damage is not.”260 The court applied Mississippi law and held
that a Mississippi policyholder could recover for loss that is caused by
wind, even if the damage was also caused concurrently by an excluded
peril.261 According to the district court, under Mississippi law, the ACC
clause was invalid. 262 Despite invalidating the ACC clause, the district
court ultimately concluded that only $1,228.16 in damages was caused by
wind rather than storm surge, and therefore limited the Leonards’ recovery
to this amount. 263
Nationwide appealed, however, because it was litigating the ACC clause
issue in other cases in the trial courts, and this ruling could potentially lead
to enormous liability to other policyholders.264 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
analyzed the ACC clause and held that “[c]ontrary to the district court’s
ruling, Nationwide’s ACC clause is not ambiguous, nor does Mississippi
law preempt the causation regime the clause applies to hurricane claims.”265
The Fifth Circuit determined that insurance policies at issue in the
Mississippi case law, on which the district court based its decision, did not
contain ACC clauses similar to the one at issue; rather, the doctrine of
efficient proximate cause controlled in those older cases.266 Furthermore,
since the Mississippi Supreme Court had not ruled on a claim involving an
ACC clause, the Fifth Circuit made an “Erie guess”267 on the issue and held
that the “use of an ACC clause to supplant the default [efficient proximate
cause] regime is not forbidden by Mississippi case law . . . [and] the ACC
clause . . . must stand.”268

The Leonards’ wind-specific assessment claimed $47,365.41, including costs for roof
replacement and structural repairs to the garage.” Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 428 (quoting Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, 693
(S.D. Miss. 2006)).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 426.
264. Id. at 428.
265. Id. at 430.
266. Id. at 433–34.
267. Id. at 431.
268. Id. at 436.
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C. Government Involvement in Natural Disaster Insurance
Although private insurers are generally the insurers of property from
natural forces, the federal and state governments have shown some interest
in entering the field of weather-related insurance.269 This section examines
government involvement in the insurance industry, including the Florida
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund and Florida’s Citizens Property Insurance
Corporation, as well as the federal government’s National Flood Insurance
Program.
1. Florida’s Response to Its Insurance Crisis
Florida is a uniquely risky insurance market because of its size and
geographical position, with 1200 miles of coastline and most of its insured
residential and commercial property lying in coastal areas vulnerable to
both wind and flooding damage.270 On August 24, 1992, Hurricane
Andrew struck South Florida and ravaged Florida’s private insurance
industry.271 When the Category 4 hurricane made landfall, the storm had
sustained wind speeds of approximately 145 miles per hour, with gusts of at
least 175 miles per hour and storm surges up to 16.9 feet.272 The storm
destroyed 28,066 homes and damaged another 107,380 homes, leaving
180,000 people homeless. 273 Andrew caused more than $15 billion274 in
insured damage.275 The scope of Hurricane Andrew’s destruction caught
many insurance companies unprepared, affecting the efficiency of claims
processing.276 In 1992, property insurers in Florida collected only $1.5
billion in premiums and paid out about ten times that amount to victims of
Hurricane Andrew. 277 As a result of the losses caused by Andrew, several
insurance companies became insolvent and most others believed they were
overexposed in Florida.278
In response to the state’s insurance crisis, the Florida legislature created
the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund.279 The creation of the fund was
necessary because “insurers were unable or unwilling to maintain

269. See 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 153:2.
270. See David Adams, Analysis: As Hurricanes Loom, Florida Insurance Lives on
Borrowed Time, REUTERS (June 1, 2013, 8:10 AM), http://www.reuters.com
/article/2013/06/01/us-usa-weather-insurance-analysis-idUSBRE95007520130601.
“Only
New York has as much exposure.” Id.
271. See Robert L. Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, Financial Compensation for Catastrophic
Loss in the United States, in DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 292, 296 (Daniel A. Farber et al.
eds., 2d ed. 2010).
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. Adjusted for inflation, the insured loss is more than $25 billion. See supra note 20
and accompanying text.
275. See 31 FLA. JUR. 2D Insurance § 2542 (2013).
276. See Rabin, supra note 271, at 296.
277. See id. at 297.
278. See id.
279. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.555(1)(a)–(f) (West 2006).
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reserves, 280 surplus, and reinsurance281 sufficient to enable [them] to pay all
claims in full in the event” of catastrophic hurricanes.282 Therefore, as a
condition of doing business in the state, each insurer is required to enter
into a reimbursement contract with the state, and in return, the contract
contains a promise “to reimburse the insurer for 45 percent, 75 percent, or
90 percent of its losses from each covered event in excess of the insurer’s
retention, plus 5 percent of the reimbursed losses to cover loss adjustment
expenses.”283
The legislature also created the Florida Commission on Hurricane Loss
Projection Methodology within the State Board of Administration. 284 The
Commission consists of “a panel of experts to provide the most actuarially
sophisticated guidelines and standards for projection of hurricane losses
possible” to develop reimbursement premium rates for the Florida
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund.285
a. Florida’s Insurer of Last Resort:
Citizens Property Insurance Corporation
Property insurance typically does not cover hurricane-related flood
damage, which has to be insured separately. 286 Additionally, most homes
in Florida are not covered by private insurance but by the federal insurance
program. 287 In 2002, the Florida legislature created Citizens Property
Insurance Corporation (“Citizens”), a not-for-profit government
corporation, which sought to more efficiently and effectively provide
insurance to homeowners in high-risk areas and others who could not find
coverage in the open, private insurance market.288 Citizens is currently
Florida’s largest property insurer with 21 percent of the entire residential
market. 289
Approximately 18 percent of every premium Citizens collected from
policyholders is allocated to pay hurricane and other catastrophe claims.290
However, if Citizens has to borrow money to pay its claims after a storm,
Florida law requires Citizens to place an assessment on both Citizens

280. Reserves are estimates of amounts insurers will have to pay for losses that have been
reported but not yet paid, for losses that have been incurred but not yet reported, and for
administrative costs of resolving claims. See 17A COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202,
§ 251:29.
281. Reinsurance is when an insurance company transfers its risk under a policy to
another insurance company. See 1A COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 9:1.
Essentially, “reinsurance is insurance for insurance companies.” Id.
282. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.555(1)(d).
283. Id. § 215.555(4)(a)–(b).
284. See id. § 627.0628.
285. Id. § 627.0628(1)(c).
286. See 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 202, § 153.16–.17.
287. See Adams, supra note 270.
288. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.351(6).
289. See Adams, supra note 270.
290. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-179, HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE :
MULTIPLE CHALLENGES MAKE EXPANDING PRIVATE COVERAGE DIFFICULT 35 (2014).
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policyholders and private insurance policyholders.291 Citizens charges
assessments in three tiers, beginning with the Citizens Policyholder
Surcharge and each additional tier is charged only if the level before it is
insufficient to eliminate Citizens’ deficit.292 Policyholders are still paying
off an assessment from Florida’s last storm, Hurricane Wilma in 2005.293
Citizens has tried to manage its exposure and reduce the potential for
assessments by issuing catastrophe bonds, which allow the insurer to
transfer risk to private investors.294 After a successful purchase of $575
million in private reinsurance and $900 million in pre-event catastrophic
bonds in 2011, Citizens set a goal of transferring at least $1 billion in
exposure to private markets by the end of 2012.295 In 2012, Citizens
reduced its risk by 42 percent by issuing $750 million in catastrophe bonds,
returning 277,000 policies to the private market, and reducing the property
value covered in its coastal policies to less than $1 million.296
b. Returning Citizens to Its Original Goal
On May 29, 2013, Florida Governor Rick Scott signed into law a new
property insurance law designed to further reduce the state’s exposure to
hurricane losses by reforming the state’s largest insurance company,
Citizens Property Insurance Corporation.297 Significantly, the bill steers
some of Citizens’ current insurance policyholders to private insurance
companies.298 The law establishes a clearinghouse program to match
Citizens policyholders and applicants with private insurers willing to offer
coverage at comparable rates.299 The new law also prevents “Citizens from
insuring homes valued at more than $1 million—a cap that gets lowered
gradually until it reache[s] $700,000 in 2017.”300 Additionally, any new
homes built in Florida’s high-risk coastal areas are no longer insured as of
July 1, 2014.301 The hope is that these changes will return Citizens to its
original purpose as the insurer of last resort.302
291. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.351(6)(b)(3)(a)–(j).
292. See CITIZENS PROP. INS. CORP., supra note 290.
293. See Adams, supra note 270.
294. See Michael Adams, Florida’s Citizens Issues Largest Catastrophe Reinsurance
Bond on Record, INS. J. (May 3, 2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
southeast/2012/05/03/246145.htm.
295. See Michael Adams, Florida’s Citizens Eyes Risk Transfer While Lawmakers Plot
Changes,
INS.
J.
(Jan.
18,
2012),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/southeast/2012/01/18/231560.htm.
296. See id.
297. See Press Release, Fla. Governor Rick Scott, Governor Scott Signs Bill to Reform
Citizens (May 29, 2013), available at http://www.flgov.com/2013/05/29/governor-scottsigns-bill-to-reform-citizens/.
298. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.3518 (2013).
299. Id. § 627.3518(5).
300. Chad Hemenway, Florida Gov. Scott Signs Bill to Reform Last-Resort Insurer,
PROPERTY CASUALTY 360° (May 30, 2013), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/
2013/05/30/florida-gov-scott-signs-bill-to-reform-last-resort.
301. Id.
302. See Hemenway, supra note 300.
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2. The Federal Response: National Flood Insurance
The federal government has often provided disaster relief after largescale storms. 303 After Hurricane Betsy struck the Gulf Coast in 1965,
private insurers began charging excessively high premiums for flood
insurance, driving many flood victims to depend on “federal taxpayerfinanced, ad hoc disaster programs.”304 The federal flood program was
created to regularize this practice of providing disaster relief and “to
provide incentives to municipalities and individuals to limit their risk
exposure.”305
a. The National Flood Insurance Program
In 1968, upon finding that many factors had made it uneconomical “for
the private insurance industry alone to make flood insurance available to
those in need of such protection on reasonable terms and conditions,”306
Congress created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to provide
flood insurance coverage. 307 The NFIP provides nationwide flood
insurance through cooperative efforts of the federal government and the
private insurance industry.308 Additionally, Congress found that a federal
program would create a uniform standard to regulate development inside
flood plains and, ultimately, minimize the risk of loss by discouraging
property development in flood prone areas.309
FEMA administers the NFIP, and participation in the program depends
on an agreement between local communities310 and the federal
government.311 Generally, the agreement states that if a community adopts
and enforces a floodplain management ordinance to reduce future flood
risks, the federal government will make flood insurance available within the
community.312
Implementation of the NFIP occurs in three stages. 313 First, the
community applies, identifies the flood prone area, prepares preliminary
303. See Daniel A. Farber, Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change, Katrina, and 9/11:
Exploring Liability for Extraordinary Risks, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1075, 1119 (2009).
304. See Dominic Spinelli, Note, Reform of the National Flood Insurance Program:
Congress Must Act Before the Next Natural Disaster, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 430, 435 (2011).
305. See Farber, supra note 303, at 1119.
306. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (2012).
307. See Rachel Lisotta, Note, In Over Our Heads: The Inefficiencies of the National
Flood Insurance Program and the Institution of Federal Tax Incentives, 10 LOY. MAR. L.J.
511, 514 (2012).
308. See 42 U.S.C. § 4001–4129.
309. See id. § 4001(c)(1)–(2).
310. Community is defined for NFIP purposes as state, area, or political subdivision. See
FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NFIP 3 (2011),
available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1438-20490-1905/f084_atq
_11aug11.pdf.
311. Id. at 1.
312. See id.
313. See Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program, 60
TUL. L. REV. 61, 73 (1985).
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Flood Insurance Rate Maps,314 and enacts a basic ordinance.315 Second, the
community enters the Emergency Program through which residents may
obtain subsidized insurance.316 Third, the community must adopt stricter
ordinances to enter the Regular Program.317
Any owner of insurable property may purchase flood insurance coverage,
provided that the community in which the property is located is a
participant in the NFIP.318 Although participation in the NFIP is voluntary,
most mortgage lenders mandate flood insurance for property located in a
participating community and in an area of high risk. 319 Property owners
may purchase NFIP coverage through any licensed property insurance
provider.320 All flood coverage through the NFIP is identical from
company to company and the rates are regulated by the NFIP.321 The rates
depend on many factors, which include the age, location, and design of the
building, along with the flood zone.322
Areas that are at high risk for floods are called Special Flood Hazard
Areas (SFHA).323 High-risk areas have at least a 1 percent annual chance
of flooding, or a one-in-four chance of flooding over the life of a thirty-year
mortgage. 324 All homeowners in these areas with mortgages from federally
regulated or insured lenders are required to purchase flood insurance.325
Areas that are at low-to-moderate risk for flooding are called Non-Special
Flood Hazard Areas (NSFHA).326 In moderate-to-low risk areas, the risk of
flooding is not immediate.327 Flood insurance is not required, although it is
recommended for all property owners and renters because historically onein-four claims come from these moderate-to-low risk areas.328

314. Flood Insurance Rate Map is the official map of a community “on which FEMA has
delineated both the special hazard areas and the risk premium zones applicable to
community.” See Flood Insurance Rate Map, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
http://www.fema.gov/floodplain-management/flood-insurance-rate-map-firm (last visited
Nov. 26, 2014).
315. See Houck, supra note 313, at 73.
316. See id.
317. See id. at 73–74.
318. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 310, at 9.
319. See id. at 11.
320. See id. at 10.
321. Id. at 3.
322. Id. at 11. Each flood zone describes the area’s risk of flooding: low, moderate, or
high. See What Are Flood Zones?, NAT’L FLOOD INS. PROGRAM, http://www.floodsmart.gov/
floodsmart/pages/faqs/what-are-flood-zones.jsp (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
323. See What is a Special Hazard Flood Area (SHFA)?, NAT’L FLOOD INS. PROGRAM,
http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/faqs/what-is-a-special-flood-hazard-area.jsp
(last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
324. See id.
325. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
326. See What is a Non-Special Flood Hazard Area (NSFHA)?, NAT’L FLOOD INS.
PROGRAM, http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/faqs/what-is-a-non-special-floodhazard-area.jsp (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
327. See id.
328. Id.
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The federal legislation establishing the NFIP also provides the types of
flood insurance. 329 The federal flood insurance covers direct physical loss
caused by “flood” and categorizes covered losses primarily by the source of
the damaging water: “an overflow of inland or tidal waters; unusual and
rapid accumulation or runoff of surface waters from any source; mudflow;
or collapse or subsidence of land . . . as a result of erosion or
undermining . . . that result in a flood.”330 Other limitations on covered
losses include a requirement that the floodwater affect two or more
properties, or more than two acres of property for the damage to be eligible
under the NFIP.331 Furthermore, the NFIP limits specific coverage to
$250,000 in damages for residential buildings and to $100,000 in damages
for personal property . 332 Currently, more than 5.5 million people hold
flood insurance policies in communities throughout the United States with
an insured value of $1.3 trillion.333
b. Problems Faced by the National Flood Insurance Program
The NFIP was intended to reduce the government’s escalating costs for
repairing flood damage. 334 Until 2004, the NFIP was able to pay most of its
claims with premiums or occasional loans from the Department of the
Treasury.335 However, after the 2005 hurricane season, the program faced
an unprecedented amount of claims and had to borrow $16.8 billion from
the Treasury.336 In 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
added the NFIP to its High-Risk List “due to losses from the 2005
hurricanes and the financial exposure the program created for the federal
government.”337
GAO reported that the NFIP’s financial condition revealed the program
The NFIP is a not-for-profit
funding’s structural weaknesses.338
institution.339 The program fulfills a public policy goal: “provide flood
insurance in flood-prone areas to property owners who otherwise would not
be able to obtain it.”340 Congress expected the NFIP to use the premiums it
collects from insureds to cover claims and its operating expenses.341
However, the program has been left financially vulnerable because of
329. See Lisotta, supra note 307, at 514; see also FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM SUMMARY OF COVERAGE, available at
http://www.floodsmart.gov/toolkits/flood/downloads/NFIP-SummaryCoverage.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 26, 2014).
330. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 329, at 1.
331. See id.
332. See id.
333. See U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-858T, NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM : CONTINUED ATTENTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS CHALLENGES 1 (2013).
334. See id. at 2.
335. Id. at 4.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
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subsidized policies.342 The NFIP sustains losses from these policies
because it is unable to collect sufficient premiums to cover losses, operating
costs, and loan payments to the Treasury. Additionally, most policies “are
associated with structures more prone to flood damage . . . because of the
way they were built or their location.”343 Losses to the NFIP are especially
great in years of catastrophic flooding.344 Furthermore, this “results in
much of the financial risk of flooding being transferred to the federal
government and ultimately the taxpayer.”345 As of July 31, 2013, the NFIP
owed approximately $24 billion to the Treasury.346
c. Insurance Reform: The Biggert-Waters Act
Recently, Congress passed the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform
Act of 2012, extending the National Flood Insurance Program until
September 30, 2017.347 Not only does the law extend the NFIP, but it also
requires significant reform of the insurance program. The law requires the
NFIP to raise rates to reflect true flood risk, make the program more
financially stable, and change how Flood Insurance Rate Map updates
impact policyholders.348 There are four major changes: First, the law
removes subsidized rate premiums for properties that have been provided
flood insurance at below-market rates since their communities first joined
the program, generally in the 1970s.349 Second, it establishes a Technical
Mapping Advisory Council intended to advise FEMA on improving the
accuracy of flood maps and on standards that should be adopted for flood
maps.350 Third, it allows premiums to rise at a significant rate on the basis
of the new maps.351 Finally, it clarifies FEMA’s authority to transfer a
portion of the nation’s flood risk to the private sector through the purchase
of reinsurance.352 Together, these efforts help increase the NFIP’s longterm financial stability.353

342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. See Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126
Stat. 916.
348. See Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
http://www.fema.gov/flood-insurance-reform-act-2012 (last updated July 24, 2014).
349. See Questions about the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, FED.
EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-191225045-9380/bw12_qa_04_2013.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
350. See Press Release, Ass’n of State Floodplain Managers, Biggert-Waters Flood
Insurance Act of 2012 Summary of Contents 5 (Aug. 2012), available at
http://www.floods.org/ace-files/documentlibrary/News_Views/August_2012_News_Views
.pdf.
351. Id. at 15.
352. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, BIGGERT-WATERS FLOOD INSURANCE REFORM
AND
MODERNIZATION
ACT
OF
2012
5
(2012),
available
at
http://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_events_2012_cipr_summit_overview.pdf.
353. See U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 333, at 5.
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The changes were phased in starting in 2012.354 However, on October
28, 2013, the Senate reached a deal delaying the changes to the federal
flood insurance program that raise premiums for many homeowners,
requiring FEMA to address the affordability of coverage before
implementing the rate increases.355
III. TORT OR INSURANCE: WHICH SYSTEM IS BEST?
Courts are presented with two alternatives for compensating hurricane
victims. Courts may allow victims to litigate their losses through the tort
system, recognizing new causes of action, where none had been recognized
before.356 Alternatively, courts can leave compensation to the insurance
industry. This part examines the goals and criticisms of tort and insurance.
The discussion begins by examining the justifications advanced in support
of the tort system, and then proceeds to discuss the criticisms of these goals.
Next, this part turns to the goals and criticisms of insurance. With these
goals and criticisms in mind, Part IV then examines which system is best
for compensating victims of hurricanes.
A. Justifications in Support of the Tort System
In the case of hurricanes, questions may arise as to whether tort law even
applies, and if it does, whether the plaintiff can prove the tortfeasor’s
negligence. 357 Because courts often define hurricanes as acts of God, the
only viable theory for recovery is usually the failure to take adequate
preventive measures.358 Thus, the scope of liability is very limited.
However, a number of different justifications have been advanced in
support of the tort system. 359 As tort law has developed, two leading
justifications have emerged: tort law as a means of providing compensation
to the injured and tort law as a means of deterring future accidents. 360
1. Making Victims Whole: Tort’s Goal of Compensation
The “cardinal principle” of damages in tort cases is that of
compensation.361 Tort liability is predicated on some form of fault on the
part of the defendant.362 Consequently, the defendant becomes the source

354. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 349.
355. See Bipartisan Deal Reached to Delay Flood Insurance Premium Hikes: Waters,
INS.
J.
(Oct.
28,
2013),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/
2013/10/28/309383.htm.
356. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
357. See Michael G. Faure, Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes: A Law
and Economics Perspective, 29 L. & POL’Y 339, 342 (2007).
358. See supra Part I.C; supra notes 3–13 and accompanying text.
359. See Beltran, supra note 18, at 154.
360. See id.
361. See Fleming James, Jr., Damages in Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 582, 583
(1956).
362. See supra note 37–50 and accompanying text.
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of compensation.363 Furthermore, compensation is seen as “repairing
plaintiff’s injury or of making him whole as nearly [as possible] by an
award of money.”364
As early as the mid-nineteenth century, “scholars and courts began to
focus on more general principles for awarding damages,” looking to the
purpose of damages as compensation. 365 Courts also started referring to the
idea of “mak[ing] the plaintiff whole” no matter what the cause of action.366
Some courts simply refer to making the victim whole,367 “while others
write in terms of returning the victim to the position she was in prior to the
accident368 . . . or putting the victim in the position she would have been in
‘had there been no injury.’”369 Even jury instructions follow this theory of
compensation, “directing the jury to award damages that will make the
victim whole or return her to the position in which she would have been had
the accident not occurred.”370
Over the past few decades, modern courts have embraced the principle of
compensation as the primary goal of tort law.371 This idea has led courts to
expand liability in certain areas, such as landowner liability.372 For
example, in Sprecher v. Adamson Co.,373 the court held that a possessor of
land is no longer immunized from liability for harm caused by the natural
condition of his land to persons outside his premises.374 In rejecting the
distinction between artificial and natural conditions in favor of ordinary
principles of negligence to determine exposure to liability, the court held:
“‘A [person’s] life or limb [or property] does not become less worthy of
protection by the law nor a loss less worthy of compensation under the law’

363. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance,
and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 75, 86 (1993).
364. See James, Jr., supra note 361, at 583.
365. See Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort
Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1578 (1997); see also McInroy v. Dyer, 47 Pa. 118,
121 (1864) (“What the law seeks to secure in an assessment of damages to an injured party is
compensation.”).
366. See McInroy, 47 Pa. at 121 (“What will make the plaintiff whole is the same in one
form of action as in the other. No distinction is recognized by the courts.”).
367. See, e.g., Varlack v. SWC Caribbean Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 1977) (stating
that “the goal in assessing compensatory tort damages is to make the plaintiff whole for
losses he has actually suffered”).
368. See, e.g., Big Rock Mountain Corp. v. Stearns-Roger Corp., 388 F.2d 165, 169 (8th
Cir. 1968) (noting that the philosophy of law is “to allow as compensation an amount which
would place him in the same position he occupied immediately prior to the injury”).
369. See Feldman, supra note 365, at 1578-79; Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443
F.2d 1245, 1249 (3d Cir. 1971) (stating that compensation is for losses the victim would not
have suffered “had he not been injured”).
370. See Feldman, supra note 365, at 1579.
371. See id. at 1578; Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV.
555, 591 (1985).
372. See Sugarman, supra note 371, at 591 n.159.
373. 636 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1981).
374. See id. at 1128.
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because that person has been injured by a natural, as opposed to an
artificial, condition.”375
Compensation or “making a victim whole” receives judicial expression
as a normative ideal in that courts see compensation as “a means of
achieving fairness.”376 This notion of fairness can be seen as an outgrowth
of the fault principle of tort: “If the defendant is the wrongdoer . . . it seems
eminently fair that these damages should (at least) put the plaintiff, as
nearly as may be, in the same position he would have been if defendant’s
wrong had not injured him.”377 Although notions of fairness are
particularly applicable to cases of personal injury, notions of fairness also
apply to cases of harm to property.378
In negligence suits, judges and juries are typically faced with choosing
between “a single plaintiff who may have suffered greatly and a defendant
who is a giant enterprise or is backed” by third-party liability insurance.379
On the one hand, judges and juries see defendants that “can readily absorb
and widely distribute this loss” through the mechanism of the price system
or through third-party liability insurance.380 On the other hand, an
individual victim may not be able to bear the financial burden of the loss
very well.381
2. The Deterrence Function of Tort Law:
Reduction of Accidents and the Optimization of Risk
Another primary goal of tort law is deterrence or the reduction of
accidents.382 Simply stated, tort liability deters dangerous conduct.383
Otherwise, without the threat of liability, people act without regard to the
safety of others, and “[a]s a result, people (and property) would be
unreasonably damaged.”384 However, tort law forces people to take the
interests of others into account by instituting liability for negligent conduct,
which threatens the possibility of litigation costs and hefty compensatory
damages. 385 Thus, tort law causes people to alter their behavior in a
“socially desirable, less injury-reducing way,” to avoid liability.386

375. See id. (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968)).
376. See SPECIAL COMM. ON TORT LIAB. SYST., TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY:
THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW
4–29 (1984).
377. See James, Jr., supra note 361, at 583.
378. SPECIAL COMM. ON TORT LIAB. SYST., supra note 376, at 4–49; see, e.g., Barker v.
S.A. Lewis Storage & Transfer Co., 61 A. 363, 363 (Conn. 1905) (holding, in a conversion
case, that “[t]he cardinal rule is that a person injured should receive fair compensation for his
loss or injury” (emphasis added)).
379. See Sugarman, supra note 371, at 591.
380. See id.
381. See id.
382. See SPECIAL COMM. ON TORT LIAB. SYST., supra note 376, at 4–3.
383. See Sugarman, supra note 371, at 559.
384. See id. at 560.
385. See id.
386. See id.
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Tort law as a deterrence mechanism can also be examined using an
economic efficiency analysis.387 Under this analysis, tort law ought to
encourage people to act efficiently and optimize accident costs.388
Proponents of this goal, like Judge Richard A. Posner, interpret Judge
Hand’s famous formula389 as giving an “economic meaning to
negligence.”390 Consequently, Judge Posner sees the negligence standard
as a weighing of costs and benefits, “promoting the most efficient allocation
of resources because its economic calculus encourages only cost-justified
precautions.”391
As discussed in Part I.B, under the Hand formula, liability depends on
whether the burden of taking a precaution is less than the loss or injury
multiplied by the probability that the loss will occur.392 Judge Posner
explains that by “the burden of taking precautions against the accident,”
Hand was referring to the cost of prevention. 393 The cost of prevention, he
further explains, “may be the cost of installing safety equipment or
otherwise making an activity safer.”394 The cost could also be seen as the
loss of a benefit caused by curtailing or eliminating an activity.395 Thus, if
the costs of prevention are less than the potential injury, “society is better
off if those costs are incurred and the accident averted.”396 Thus, tort
liability is imposed leading the tortfeasor to adopt “precautions in order to
avoid a greater cost in tort judgments.”397 If, on the other hand, the cost of
precautions exceeds the potential loss by injury (B > PL), “society would be
better off, in economic terms, to forgo accident prevention.”398 Here, the
threat of liability cannot “induce the [injurer] to increase the safety of [his
conduct]” because a “rational profit-maximizing [person] will pay tort
judgments to the accident victims rather than incur the larger cost of
avoiding liability.”399 Furthermore, Judge Posner explains, in such
instances it is more efficient for society to allow the defendant to avoid the
excessive costs of accident prevention.400
Judge Posner applies the same economic analysis to accident avoidance
by the victim. 401 If the victim could have avoided the accident by taking
precautions “at lower cost than any measure taken by the injurer would

387. See SPECIAL COMM. ON TORT LIAB. SYST., supra note 376, at 4–13.
388. See id.
389. See supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text.
390. See Posner, supra note 83, at 32.
391. See John G. Fleming, Is There a Future for Tort?, 44 LA. L. REV. 1193, 1200 (1984);
see also Posner, supra note 83, at 32–33.
392. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
393. See Posner, supra note 83, at 32.
394. See id.
395. See id.
396. See id. at 33.
397. See id.
398. See id. at 32.
399. See id. at 32–33.
400. Id. at 33.
401. See id.
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involve, it [is] uneconomical to adopt a rule of liability that placed the
burden of accident prevention on the injurer.”402
Thus, according to Judge Posner, the “dominant function” of tort law is
to encourage people to act efficiently or optimize accident costs.403 Under
this view, “a judgment of negligence implies that there was a cheaper
alternative to the accident.”404 Conversely, where the alternatives to the
accident are burdensome, it is less efficient to attach liability to a
defendant’s actions.405
Optimizing accident costs is also the basis for Judge Guido Calabresi’s
analysis of the tort system. 406 Using an economic analysis of tort law,
Judge Calabresi views the primary goal of tort law as a means to minimize
the cost of accidents.407 Judge Calabresi further divided this goal down into
three subgoals: (1) primary cost avoidance (the reduction in the number
and severity of accidents resulting in injuries); (2) secondary cost avoidance
(the reduction of societal costs resulting from accidents); and (3) tertiary
cost avoidance (the reduction in the costs of administering a regulatory
system for achieving primary and secondary cost avoidance). 408 In order to
reduce the cost of accidents, Judge Calabresi argues that the tort system
should focus on primary accident cost avoidance or the deterrence of
accidents, rather than secondary cost avoidance.409 Additionally, according
to Judge Calabresi, tort law ought to work by means of general
deterrence. 410
Judge Calabresi, as an economist, assumes that individuals will respond
to price changes.411 General deterrence (or market deterrence) encourages
individuals through pricing to avoid a given course of conduct or to go
about it in a way that promises to make it less expensive.412 Specifically,
the general deterrence approach operates in two ways to reduce accident
costs.413 First, it creates incentives to engage in safer activities—some
people who would engage in a relatively dangerous activity at prices that
did not reflect its accident costs will shift to a safer activity if the accident
costs are reflected in prices. 414 Thus, the shift from a dangerous activity to

402. See id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. See id.
406. Timothy C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public Tort,
58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1032 (2001).
407. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 26–27 (1970).
408. See id. at 26–29.
409. See id. at 43–44.
410. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64
MD. L. REV. 364, 375 (2005).
411. See CALABRESI, supra note 407, at 70.
412. See id. at 103–04.
413. See id. at 73.
414. See id.
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a safer activity will reduce accident costs.415 Second, general deterrence
reduces accident costs by encouraging persons to make activities safer.416
A general deterrence approach presents a follow-up question: Who ought
the law incentivize to change his conduct to promote primary accident cost
avoidance most effectively?417 Calabresi’s answer is that the law ought to
search for the cheapest cost avoider and place the losses associated with
certain accidents on that actor.418 If the goal of general deterrence is
primary accident cost avoidance, then the tort system should allocate the
costs of accidents to those who could avoid the accident costs most
cheaply. 419 Cost avoidance should be the responsibility of the actor who is
in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs
and accident avoidance costs and to take preventive measures when they are
cheaper than the avoided accident costs.420
B. Criticisms of the Tort System
Professor Sugarman argues that there is widespread social consensus in
favor of deterring socially undesirable behavior and compensating
victims.421 However, the tort system has many critics. 422 These critics
argue that the justifications advanced in support of the tort system are
unattainable or inefficiently pursued. 423 This part explores these criticisms
by first examining the criticisms of tort’s goal of compensation and then
turning to the criticisms of the goal of deterrence.
1. Failure to Compensate
The first serious criticism of tort law is that its goal of compensation
fails. The deficiencies of tort as a compensation system can generally be
seen as undercompensation and overcompensation, arbitrary compensation,
and high administrative costs that undercut compensation.424
415. See id.
416. See id. Calabresi offers an example to illustrate how general deterrence operates to
cause an activity to become safer:
Taney drives a car. His car causes, on the average, $200 per year in accident costs.
If a different kind of brake were used in the car, this would be reduced to $100.
The new kind of brake costs the equivalent of $50 per year. If the accident costs
Taney causes are paid either by the state out of general taxes or by those who are
injured, he has no financial incentive to put in the new brake. But if Taney has to
pay, he will certainly put the new brake in. He will thus bear a new cost of $50 per
year, but it will be less than the $100 per year in accident costs he will avoid. As a
result, the cost of accidents to society will have been reduced by $50.
Id. at 73–74.
417. See id. at 135–36.
418. See id. at 135–40.
419. See id. at 135.
420. See id. at 135–40.
421. See Sugarman, supra note 371, at 616.
422. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the “Crisis”: A Reassessment of Current
Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 765 (1987); Sugarman, supra note 371.
423. See Sugarman, supra note 371, at 558–59.
424. Id. at 592.
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“Tort law cannot provide compensation to enormous numbers of accident
victims.”425 There are many accidents where the plaintiff cannot identify a
plausible defendant with superior loss-spreading ability.426 Many tort
defendants are judgment-proof or have no funds to satisfy tort
judgments.427 Plaintiffs will also “settle cases for less than full loss because
of delay, lack of proof, urgent financial need, contributory negligence, and
limited insurance.”428 Furthermore, despite the liberalization of certain tort
claims, courts have generally narrowed liability. 429 Absent fault, there is no
liability.430
Thus, “both reality and current doctrine create a substantial liability
gap.”431 Furthermore, “tort law bars compensation to victims who, from
the perspective of their need, are as deserving as those who succeed through
the system. ”432 Thus, the tort system leaves a large proportion of seriously
injured victims uncompensated or substantially undercompensated.433
However, on the other hand, compared with other systems of
compensation, tort law may be overcompensating victims.434 Although
many tort cases result in no claims at all, plaintiffs in other cases may
receive more compensation than they deserve because defendants find
buying off claims cheaper than litigation.435 Tort law also refuses to
consider the victim’s other sources of compensation, like insurance. 436
Compensation through tort can also seem arbitrary.437 “Geographical
bias also pervades the system.”438 For example, states have adopted
considerably different positions toward the problem of asbestos injuries,
even though the problem is national.439
Finally, the tort system is administratively expensive in comparison to
other compensation systems.440 First, liability insurance policies lead to
large insurance commissions and other marketing costs.441 And, the
“highly individualized and unpredictable rules [of tort law] promote
exorbitant claims administration, including investigation costs and lawyer

425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 593; see also Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society: “As the System
Currently Operates, Liability Is, for Wrongdoers . . . Voluntary,” 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
603, 606 (2006).
428. See Sugarman, supra note 371, at 593–94.
429. Id. at 593.
430. Id.; see also supra notes 39–50 and accompanying text.
431. Sugarman, supra note 371, at 593.
432. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 422, at 768–69.
433. See Sugarman, supra note 371, at 594; see also Beltran, supra note 18, at 180.
434. See Sugarman, supra note 371, at 595.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 594.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 596.
441. Id.
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fees.”442 As a result, probably only half of any insurance money goes to the
plaintiff.443
2. General Deterrence Fails
The major criticism of tort as a deterrence mechanism is that this
function “overemphasizes both the amount of overly dangerous activity that
would occur without tort liability, and the amount of injury-reduction
achieved.”444 More specifically, the tort model of general deterrence fails
for five reasons.445
First, people are usually ignorant of the law.446 Deterrence requires
knowledge.447 Yet, Sugarman argues that many people seem to be ignorant
of the threat of tort liability.448 He attributes this “in part to individual
inattentiveness and in part to our society’s failure to instruct people
effectively in their civil obligations.”449 Furthermore, even a sophisticated
potential tort defendant has many reasons to see the system as highly
unpredictable. 450 “These reasons include doctrinal complexity, rapid legal
change, state-to-state variance, the perceived lottery-like nature of secret
jury decision-making, the [inconsistencies] of trials, and [quick settlement]
practices.”451
People may also fail to appreciate that they are engaging in injuryproducing conduct.452 This can occur because people are not aware of the
consequences of their behavior. On the other hand people might not take
the time to “analyze all the information necessary to make the ‘right’
decision” because such decisions often take “too much time, money, or
attentiveness.”453 Thus, people may “rely on shortcuts such as rules of
thumb or advice and customs of others.”454 Unavailability of information
can also undermine deterrence. 455 For example, “people don’t become
aware that their conduct or product is harmful until long after the harm has
occurred.”456
Second, people are generally incompetent.457 The “reasonable person”
standard is difficult for ordinary people to meet.458 “Ordinary people
occasionally act clumsily, rashly, or absent-mindedly.”459
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 561.
445. Id. at 565–70.
446. See Smith, supra note 422, at 772–73.
447. See Sugarman, supra note 371, at 565–70.
448. Id.; see also Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 323, 340 (2012).
449. See Sugarman, supra note 371, at 565.
450. Id. at 566.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 567.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 568; see also Beltran, supra note 18, at 185.
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Third, people generally discount the threat of tort liability.460 Sometimes
this discounting can be quite rational because some victims with bona fide
claims will not sue or the judicial system will fail to impose liability.461
Additionally, a defendant “is aware that many cases can be settled for far
less than the . . . damages incurred.”462 Or the risk is discounted because it
is so small.463 Still further, larger risks are ignored because potential
tortfeasors “hop[e] that miraculously no one will be hurt or that they [will
not] be caught.”464
Fourth, people put their personal needs before those of others, even when
Yet the conduct remains socially
their conduct is dangerous.465
unacceptable. 466 Still, the tort law system, through settlements, leads
“people to conclude that paying monetary damages is an acceptable tradeoff
for the ability to engage in objectionable high-stakes conduct.”467
Fifth, people generally conclude that they face little penalty because the
tortfeasor can almost always avoid an official slap on the wrist by
settlement. 468 Related to this is the idea, Sugarman argues, that people will
not change their behavior in response to the threat of having to pay for the
harm they cause if, in practice, that threat is sharply reduced or
eliminated. 469 The threat to pay damages is reduced or eliminated due to a
few factors. For example, many individuals do not have the resources with
which to pay damages. 470 Thus, “the threat of a judgment is not
meaningful.”471 Additionally, tort damages are inadequate. 472 The
deterrence function of tort law “requires the correct threat in order to
produce the appropriate safety-minded response.”473 But tort damages are
meant to compensate those who are injured and not to deter the injurer.474
Finally, market imperfections also weaken the penalty of tort damages.475
A defendant can always shift the cost of tort damages to its consumers and
avoid any meaningful loss.476

458. See Sugarman, supra note 371, at 568.
459. Id.
460. See id. at 569.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 570.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 570–71; see also Steven D. Smith, Rhetoric and Rationality in the Law of
Negligence, 69 MINN. L. REV. 277, 308–14 (1984) (noting that the judicial system
encourages private resolution through settlement).
469. See Sugarman, supra note 371, at 571.
470. Id. at 571–72.
471. Id. at 572.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id. at 572–73.
475. Id. at 573.
476. Id.
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C. The Role of First-Party Insurance in the Compensatory System
Another significant part of the compensatory system for hurricane
victims is first-party insurance.477 First-party insurance protection trends
away from tort law as victims seek protection before the loss occurs.478
Under such a scheme, in the event of significant loss the burden of
compensating the victim falls on the victim’s own insurer, rather than a
third-party tortfeasor.479 The role of first-party insurance is “to protect
communal welfare by protecting against catastrophic losses” such that firstparty insurance “can fill in where the tort system cannot provide
remedies.”480 For example, first-party insurance may protect against events
that are arguably not caused through the fault of any actor, such as fire or
flood damage. 481 Insurance protects the communal welfare by performing
three related but distinct functions in the compensatory system: riskbearing, risk-distribution, and loss prevention.
1. A Risk-Bearing Role
First, insurance transfers risk from the insured to the insurer.482 This
transfer of risk “enhances economic stability and personal security by
making the future more predictable.”483 It is assumed that a vast majority
of individuals are risk averse when faced with the possibility of large future
losses.484 Risk aversion is the preference for certainty over uncertainty with
regard to future losses.485 Thus, “a risk averse individual will pay a small
premium now to protect against potentially large, but uncertain losses in the
future . . . .”486 Furthermore, risk aversion also affects what type of
insurance and how much coverage an individual purchases.487
2. A Risk-Spreading Role
Next, insurance is a mechanism by which risk is spread among many
individuals.488 Insurance spreads the risk of loss among all participants by
pooling insureds.489 Pooling insureds is a successful method of spreading
risk because not all insureds will suffer losses at the same time and the pool
is large enough to sustain some loss.490 Thus, “insurance is a risk-sharing

477. See Rick Swedloff, Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 744 (2012).
478. See Faure, supra note 208, at 12.
479. See id. at 11–12.
480. See Swedloff, supra note 477, at 744.
481. See id.
482. See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Role of Insurance, in COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY
FOR PRODUCT AND PROCESS INJURIES 1, 2 (1987).
483. Id.
484. See Avraham, supra note 206, at 37.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. See Abraham, supra note 482, at 2.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id.
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arrangement.”491 It spreads the loss among a larger group of people.492
The risk-sharing function of insurance largely erodes the “individualistic
rationale of traditional tort law.”493
3. Loss Prevention
Finally, insurance may also prevent or minimize loss.494 Insurance
companies have the institutional knowledge and expertise to suggest and
implement cost-effective preventative measures.495 Through reduced
premiums insurers may incentivize insureds to prevent or minimize loss.496
For example, the installation of a sprinkler system may reduce the risk of a
fire destroying a commercial property by half.497 Not only is the risk of the
property being destroyed reduced by installing the sprinkler system, the
insurance “premium to be paid is also likely reduced to [a little more than]
$5,000.”498 The property owner will have an incentive to upgrade its
sprinkler system and thus reduce the risk of his future loss “if installing and
maintaining the sprinkler system will cost less than $5,000 per year, and its
installation can be easily verified by the insurer.”499
D. Problems with First-Party Insurance
For insurance to effectively perform its three functions, it must overcome
four problems: (1) accurate prediction of risk, (2) moral hazard, (3) crosssubsidization, and (4) adverse selection. The following four sections
discuss these problems in detail.
For the insurance system to be successful, insurance companies must be
able to accurately predict risk.500 This predictability is fundamental to
setting a price for coverage and pooling its insureds.501 Without reliable
information “about the probability and magnitude of losses . . . insurance
cannot function effectively.”502
When insurance premiums do not adequately reflect the risk being
insured against, “insureds will not fully internalize expected accident costs
and, consequently, will not invest efficiently in prevention.”503 This is
491. Id.
492. See Fleming, supra note 391, at 1209.
493. Id.
494. See Avraham, supra note 206, at 40.
495. Id.
496. Id.
497. Id. In this example, fire insurance on a property is “worth one million dollars [and]
the chance of a fire destroying the property in a given year is 1%, which means the expected
loss for that year is $10,000 and the insurance premium must be at least slightly more than
that amount.” Id.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. See Abraham, supra note 482, at 3.
501. See id.
502. See id.
503. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An
Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 138 (1990).
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called “moral hazard.”504 Despite the risk being reflected in higher
premiums, the insured only considers her individual cost because the true
cost of the risk is spread among policyholders.505 Therefore, insurance is
not effective in preventing accidents because insureds are not “required to
weigh the full costs to themselves of an accident-prone activity against the
benefits . . . .”506
Related to the problem of accurately predicting risk is crosssubsidization. Policyholders are not charged premiums based on their
individual risk.507 For example, policyholders “who present different levels
of risk . . . are charged the same premium and lumped into the same
insurance pool [as] low-damage insureds [and end up] cross-subsidiz[ing]
high-damage insureds.”508 Accordingly, the low-risk policyholders pay
more than the amount necessary to incentivize them to avoid dangerous
conduct. 509
Another problem with insurance occurs “when potential insureds who
know that they pose above average risk ‘self-select’ into insurance
pools.”510 Known as “adverse selection,” this problem is a caused by
“(1) the insurer’s inability to classify insureds perfectly according to each
insured’s [risk], and (2) the insureds knowing how their own [risks]
compare to the average expected damages of the insurance pool.”511
Adverse selection poses a problem because it “rais[es] the pool’s average
risk and thereby forces low-risk individuals to choose between paying
disproportionately high premiums or foregoing insurance.”512
IV. NO CLEAR WINNER: EXAMINING HURRICANE VICTIM COMPENSATION
IN LIGHT OF THE GOALS AND CRITICISMS
OF THE TORT AND INSURANCE SYSTEMS
The legal system provides a mix of public and private methods for
compensating victims of natural disasters.513 Part IV attempts to determine
which system, tort or insurance, is best for compensating hurricane victims
by examining hurricane compensation in light of the goals and criticisms of
the two systems. First, Part IV.A considers hurricane compensation in light
of the goals and criticisms of the tort system. Next, Part IV.B considers the
compensation of hurricane victims in light of the goals and criticisms of the
insurance system. Finally, this Note concludes that neither system
adequately compensates all hurricane victims, although tort law may
achieve its goal of deterrence in a natural disaster context.
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A. Examining Tort Law
First, before the success of tort’s goals can be evaluated, the issue of
whether there is even a role for tort in a hurricane-related context must be
addressed. Specifically, in the context of hurricane-related damage, tort
litigation against responsible private parties has significant limitations.514
First, a plaintiff must prove the tortfeasor’s fault to recover.515 Second,
overcoming certain defenses, such as the act of God defense, is also
essential to recovery.516 Additionally, responsible governmental actors are
almost always immune from suit.517 Thus, tort litigation is limited to
actions against private actors who negligently fail to take reasonable
measures to prevent hurricane-related damage, such as the 2 Gold
defendants.518
The tort law system’s goals of compensating victims for their injuries and
deterring future accidents are commendable, but, as the discussion above
has shown, there is great debate regarding whether tort can effectively
achieve either of these goals.519 First, there has been tremendous
discussion over whether tort damages actually compensate an injured
victim. 520
Tort’s goal of making a victim whole simply means placing the victim in
a position he would have been in had the damage not occurred.521 In the
circumstances of hurricane victims, such as the residents of 2 Gold, this
would mean replacing items that were stolen or damaged due to the
defendants’ negligence. 522 In situations involving serious real and personal
property damage after a hurricane, tort damages can be insufficient. First,
there may be no plausible defendant because of certain immunities and
defenses, so there may be no recovery at all.523 Second, the substantive law
may bar the suit altogether.524 Thus, although the assertions that tort law
overcompensates seem unfounded in this context, the argument by tort
critics that tort undercompensates seems to ring true.525
Next, if a potential plaintiff is successful in litigating a claim, the tort
system can take a substantial portion of the damages for administrative
costs and attorney’s fees, leaving the victim with even less
compensation.526 Finally, the ability of individuals to purchase insurance
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that will provide them with protection should hurricane damage occur
reveals that the law’s compensation function is less essential.527
Despite these factors, the tort system continues to play a role, though in
somewhat limited circumstances, as a deterrent.528 In the context of a tort
action for the negligent failure to take reasonable measures to prevent
hurricane-related damage, the threat of tort liability may successfully lead
individuals to take more care.529 Many sophisticated hurricane-related
defendants, like TF Cornerstone, were in the best position to make the costbenefit analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to
take the preventative measures, if cheaper than the accident costs.530 A
judgment of liability implies there was a cheaper alternative to the
damage. 531 Some defendants may shift these costs to consumers, but the
threat of tort liability will cause other potential tortfeasors to take necessary
precautions in the future, avoiding serious damage. 532 Thus, in the
hurricane-related context tort law may serve more as a deterrence
mechanism than as compensation.
B. Examining Insurance
Catastrophic losses are precisely the kinds of risk for which lossspreading, through some sort of insurance scheme, seems most
appropriate.533 The advance purchase of private insurance that covers a
particular peril in question may ameliorate the financial consequences of
many of the losses that result from catastrophic events like hurricanes.534
However, the insurance method of compensation also has limitations
when it comes to compensating hurricane victims.535 Specifically,
hurricanes adversely affect and will continue to affect insurers’ ability to
adequately perform its goals.536 For example, insurers will feel the impact
of hurricanes on property, where the insurer bears the risk of the loss
suffered directly by the policyholder.537 Large-scale natural disasters, such
as hurricanes, are a significant threat to insurer solvency.538
Additionally, the unavailability of insurance due to the exclusion of
certain catastrophic risks creates significant hurdles to recovery.539
Furthermore, potential victims may not purchase insurance even if it is
available. 540 Some people may feel they simply cannot afford to buy the
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insurance, while others, who could afford to buy private insurance coverage
do not because they might fail to appreciate their own risk.541 This could
happen if coverage is sold separately for a specific risk, such as flood
insurance, because potential victims may discount that particular threat to
them, thereby concluding that insurance is unnecessary and too
expensive. 542
The insurance industry seems reluctant to provide coverage for largescale natural disasters.543 This reluctance may be in part because of the
difficulty of assessing risk levels, as well as the costs associated with
maintaining large levels of reserve or reinsurance.544 Flood damage
insurance provides a good example. 545 The federal flood insurance
program is based in part on the reluctance of the private market to provide
such insurance on a broad scale.546 However, the federally subsidized flood
insurance is not an entirely satisfactory solution. Private losses from
catastrophes in the United States have been rising faster than premiums,
causing the government’s liabilities to exceed its assets, leading to extreme
debt.547 The government has tried to counteract this problem by raising
premiums to reflect properties’ true risk, but such changes have been
halted.548 Both private and public insurance systems leave gaps in
compensation because they can only compensate those who have insurance.
Thus, neither private nor public insurance successfully compensates all
hurricane victims.
CONCLUSION
Hurricanes are unpredictable, unavoidable, and most often devastating.
There is some consensus that hurricanes may increase in the future, and if
they do, there is no doubt that significant damage will occur.549 When such
damage occurs, those who have suffered loss will seek compensation either
from their insurance provider or the tort system.550
This Note provides a hard look at which system, tort or insurance, would
best compensate hurricane victims.551 However, when the next large-scale
natural disaster strikes the United States, it is difficult to imagine which
mechanism will best compensate victims because each system is plagued
with limitations and neither system satisfactorily makes victims whole.552
There is one significant role tort could play in hurricane-related damage—
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the role of deterrence. 553 Tort could effectively deter negligent behavior by
imposing liability on those who negligently fail to prepare and prevent
hurricane-related damage.554

553. See supra notes 528–30 and accompanying text.
554. See supra notes 528–30 and accompanying text.

